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THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT:
IS THERE AN ENFORCEMENT ROLE FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS?
The number of divorced parents has increased dramatically since 1970.1
Consequently, the number of custody disputes has risen. In our in-
creasingly mobile society, it is not surprising that many of these disputes
occur across state lines.2 Extended litigation creates additional uncertainty
and instability for children involved in these disputes. 3
In response to this growing problem, Congress enacted the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA).4 The PKPA requires that state
courts enforce and not modify the child custody determinations of other
states.5 The duty to enforce arises if the initial custody determination meets
certain conditions. 6 Despite the existence of the PKPA, interstate custody
disputes continue to be a problem, and parents have sought resolution of
these disputes in federal court.
Congress did not explicitly create a private, federal right of action to
enforce the PKPA's provisions. The federal courts are divided over whether
litigants are entitled to enforce the PKPA in federal court. 7 Those courts
concluding that the Act does not create a cause of action in federal court are
correct in their interpretation of the PKPA. However, the states have not
dealt effectively with interstate child custody disputes and the underlying
problem remains unsolved. For these reasons, this Comment recommends
that Congress amend the PKPA to allow federal court enforcement of
custody determinations in limited circumstances.
1. In 1970, there were 708,000 divorces involving approximately 615,960 children in the United
States. In 1983, there were 1,158,000 divorces involving approximately 1,091,000 children. BUREAU OF
THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNrrED STATES 1987 80 (107th
ed. 1987).
2. See Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human
Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1980)
[hereinafter Joint Hearing] (opening statement of Senator Mathias).
3. Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 105-6 (testimony of Dr. Jeanette I. Minkoff, probation-family
services coordinator, Monroe County, New York).
4. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-73 (1980).
5. This portion of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1982). The PKPA also amended the Fugitive Felon Act to make it applicable to parents who
abduct or retain their children in violation of state law, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982), and extended the
Federal Parent Locator Service to abducted children, 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1982).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982).




A. Interstate Custody Disputes Prior to the PKPA
Before the PKPA was enacted, conflicting state custody determinations
involving the same child or children were persistent problems. 8 State courts
were willing to assert jurisdiction over custody matters9 and tended to
award custody to litigants residing within their borders rather than to
nonresident contestants.10 The Supreme Court consistently held that the
state courts were bound by the custody determination of another state only
to the extent that the state court that issued the determination was bound
thereby. 1 Because custody determinations are modifiable on a showing of
changed circumstances, 12 a prior custody determination had little effect on
another state court's ability to determine the custody issue. 13
In addition, under the doctrine known as the domestic relations excep-
tion, a federal forum traditionally was not available in cases involving child
custody disputes. 14 If states refused or were unable to resolve conflicting
determinations, persons subject to conflicting determinations had no ade-
quate remedy. 15 As a result, parents who were unhappy with a custody
determination had incentive to flee to a new jurisdiction and relitigate the
matter. 16
In the late 1960's, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UC-
CJA) 17 was developed to help resolve the problems in enforcing custody
8. See Krauskopf, Remedies for Parental Kidnapping in Federal Court: A Comment Applying the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act in Support of Judge Edwards, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 429-35
(1984).
9. See Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN.
L. REv. 711, 717-19 (1982); Lansing & Sherman, The Legal Response To Child Snatching, 7 J. Juv. L.
16, 16-17 (1983).
10. See Krauskopf, supra note 8, at 430-31.
11. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192(1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604,607(1958); New
York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947).
12. See, e.g., UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 14 commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 111,
154 (1979) [hereinafter UCCJA].
13. See Donigan, Child Custody Jurisdiction: New Legislation Reflects Public Policy Against
Parental Abduction, 19 GONZ. L. REv. 1, 4 (1983/84); Krauskopf, supra note 8, at 430-3 1.
14. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the federal judiciary created an exception to
federal court jurisdiction for cases involving domestic relations matters. The domestic relations
exception has since been applied by the judiciary to bar federal courts from exercising jurisdiction in
cases where domestic relations matters form a significant element of the controversy. For a discussion of
the domestic relations exception see infra notes 111-27 and accompanying text. See also Atwood,
Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise ofJurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 571, 575-84 (1984); Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1824, 1830-32 (1983).
15. See Coombs, supra note 9, at 718.
16. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(a)(3), 94 Stat. 3566,
3568 (1980).
17. UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
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determinations across state lines. 18 The UCCJA provides for interstate
cooperation and establishes strict guidelines for exercising jurisdiction over
child custody disputes. 19
The UCCJA proved to be an inadequate solution to the problem of
interstate child custody disputes for several reasons. First, the Act's juris-
dictional standards were sufficiently flexible for states to exercise jurisdic-
tion concurrently. 20 Second, states were slow to adopt the UCCJA.21
Finally, some states adopted variations of the original act,22 and differing
state court interpretations of the UCCJA led to a lack of uniformity in
application. 23 As a result, several states were able to exercise jurisdiction
over a single custody matter. By the late 1970's, the need for another
solution to interstate child custody conflicts was apparent.
B. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
In December 1980, Congress enacted the PKPA in response to a growing
concern about the phenomenon of parental kidnapping.24 As part of this
effort, Congress sought to eliminate the incentive to kidnap children
created by the possibility of obtaining a favorable custody determination in
another state.25 The PKPA extends full faith and credit principles to child
custody determinations 26 and sets jurisdictional standards designed to
ensure that only one state27 at a time may exercise jurisdiction over a
18. Id., Commissioners' Prefatory Note at 111-14.
19. See Donigan, supra note 13, at 5-14.
20. Krauskopf, supra note 8, at 431-32.
21. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have now adopted the UCCJA. See UCCJA, 9
U.L.A. 28-29 (Supp. Pamphlet 1987). At the time Congress enacted the PKPA, only 43 states had
adopted some form of the UCCJA. The remaining states had become havens for child snatchers. See P.
HoFF, LEGAL REMEDIES IN PARErrAL KIDNAPPING CASES: A COu.tCrON oFMATEuts 8 (5th ed. 1986).
22. For a list of the variations from the official text of the UCCJA, see the action in adopting
jurisdictions section following each section of the UCCJA -in UCCJA, supra note 12.
23. See Krauskopf, supra note 8, at 434-35.
24. See Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979, S.105: Addendum to Joint Hearing on S.105
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on
Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor andHuman Resources, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 63-65 (1980) [hereinafterAddendum to Joint Hearing] (paper by Michael Agopian, Instructor of
* Sociology, West Los Angeles College).
, 25. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3566,3568-69
(1980) (congressional findings and purpose).
26. The PKPA provides that "[t]he appropriate authorities shall enforce according to its terms and
shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination
made consistently withtheprovisions of this section by acourtofanotherstate." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)
(1982).
* A custody determination is defined as "ajudgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the
custody or visitation of a child and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and
modifications." 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) (1982).
27. The PKPA includes in its definition of "state" the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
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particular child. 28 The Act also gives jurisdictional priority to the state that
initially issued a custody determination over subsequent states that acquire
jurisdiction. 29 Congress intended to end interstate competition in custody
matters and in turn decrease the incentive to snatch a child. 30
In order for a custody determination to be entitled to enforcement, it
must be made in accordance with the PKPA's jurisdictional guidelines. 3'
The PKPA's jurisdictional standards are modeled after those of the UC-
CJA. 32 However, unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA's jurisdictional bases are
prioritized. First preference is given to the child's home state. 33 If no state
has jurisdiction under the home state provision, a state may take jurisdic-
tion on the grounds that it has a significant connection with the child and at
least one contestant.34 A state may assert jurisdiction because it is in the
best interests of the child to do so if no other state has jurisdiction under the
other bases. 35 If another state has declined jurisdiction on the ground that
the second state is the most appropriate forum to determine custody of the
child, a state may also assert jurisdiction because it is in the best interests of
the child.36 Finally, the PKPA provides that a state court shall not exercise
jurisdiction if a proceeding is pending in another state that is exercising
jurisdiction in accordance with the PKPA's provisions. 37
The PKPA's jurisdictional standards are not completely prioritized. A
state may assert jurisdiction in emergency circumstances if the child is
territories and possessions of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(8) (1982).
28. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
29. A court may only modify a custody determination of another state if it has jurisdiction and the
other state no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify its determination.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1982).
30. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569
(1980).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982).
32. In fact, the standards of the UCCJA and the PKPA are virtually identical except for the
prioritization under the PKPA. For this reason, one court has concluded that Congress merely intended
to make all states comply with the UCCJA when it adopted the PKPA. See Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683,
695 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
33. The PKPA defines home state as:
[Tihe [sitate in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child
less than six months old, the [sitate in which the child lived from birth with any of such persons.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (1982).
A state may take jurisdiction under the home state provision if it has jurisdiction under its own laws
and it is the child's home state on the date the proceeding began or it has been the child's home state
within six months of the date the proceeding began and a contestant continues to live in the state. 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (1982).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (1982).
35. 28 U.S.C, § 1738A(c)(2)(D) (1982).
36. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (1982).
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physically present in that state.38 A state also may exercise jurisdiction
consistently with the PKPA if ithas continuing jurisdiction over the child.39
C. Continuing Problems Under the PKPA
The PKPA failed completely to prohibit concurrent exercises ofjurisdic-
tion. Congress attempted to eliminate the possibility of conflicting state
custody disputes by giving priority to the child's home state for initial
custody determinations 4° and by limiting the ability of another state to
modify that determination. 41 Unfortunately, state courts have interpreted
the PKPA to allow jurisdiction in many instances where disputes arise.42
There are at least two ways in which states can exercise jurisdiction
despite a concurrent proceeding in another state. 43 A second state may
exercise jurisdiction if it finds that the first is not exercising jurisdiction
consistently with the provisions of the PKPA. 4 In addition, if the petition
for a custody determination is based on emergency circumstances, a state
may be able to ignore a concurrent proceeding in another state. 45
State courts have also expansively interpreted their power to modify a
custody determination under the PKPA. 46 Although a state has a duty under
the Act to enforce the custody determination of another state, this duty is
not absolute.47 A forum state may modify that determination if the first state
38. A state may take jurisdiction over a custody determination if "the child is physically present in
such [s]tate and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(2)(C) (1982).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(E) (1982). A state's jurisdiction continues under the PKPA as long as
it continues to have jurisdiction under the state's own law and the child or any contestant continue to
reside there. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1982).
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 29.
42. This Comment does not mean to suggest that state courts are deliberately violating the PKPA.
Rather, they understandably find it difficult to avoid asserting jurisdiction if there is a basis for doing so.
Cf. Lansing & Sherman, supra note 9, at 16-18. Some courts have scrupulously followed the spirit of the
Act. See, e.g., Tufares v. Wright, 98 N.M. 8, 644 P.2d 522 (1982). Unfortunately, that has not been
enough to prevent problems from arising.
43. Occasionally, genuine issues of statutory interpretation also may arise. In one case, a dispute
arose over the meaning of the word residence in the PKPA's continuing jurisdiction provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1982). See McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F2d 1465, 1482-84 (lth Cir. 1986).
44. The PKPA prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction during the pendency of a proceeding in
another state if the first state "is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to
make a custody determination." 28 U.S.C. § 1783A(g) (1982).
45. 28 U.S.C § 1738A(c)(2)(C) (1982). The PKPA does not make it clear whether a state may take
jurisdiction under the emergency circumstances provision during the pendency of a proceeding in
another state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C), 1738A(g) (1982).
46. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), 1738A(f) (1982).
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no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise jurisdiction. 48 By
narrowly interpreting the continuing jurisdiction provisions of the issuing
state49 or finding an implied declination of jurisdiction, 50 state courts have
expanded their ability to modify custody determinations beyond the Con-
gressional intent embodied in the PKPA. As a consequence, children
continue to suffer from the instability and uncertainty created by con-
current exercises of jurisdiction. 5'
D. Federal Case Law Interpreting the PKPA
Contestants have attempted to settle the problems presented by conflict-
ing state court decisions by seeking relief in federal court. 52 Although
Congress did not specifically provide a role for the federal courts in the
enforcement of the PKPA, several cases have been brought in federal court
seeking to enforce the Act's provisions. The federal courts have not agreed
whether such an action is proper. Federal decisions interpreting the PKPA
fall into three general categories.
1. Cases Allowing a Private Right of Action in Federal Court
In Flood v. Braaten,53 the Third Circuit held that the PKPA created a
private right of action in federal court to enforce compliance with its
provisions. 54 The Flood court found that federal courts should not abstain
from exercising federal question jurisdiction in an action brought under the
PKPA because to do so would amount to a judicial repeal of the statutory
rights granted by the PKPA. 55 Relying on the language of the PKPA and its
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1982).
49. See, e.g., Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 441 N.Y.S.2d 911, 915-16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981)
(interpreting willingness of California courts in previous cases to decline jurisdiction as lack of
jurisdiction under California law); Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1981) (finding Illinois no longer had jurisdiction without discussing Illinois law at all).
50. The PKPA does not define what constitutes a declination of jurisdiction by the state which
issued the initial determination. For one extreme interpretation see E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595, 446
A.2d 871, 876-80 (1982).
51. For a discussion of the effect of parental kidnapping on families see B. LAWRENCE & 0.
TAYLOR-YOUNG, THE CHILD SNATCHERS (1983).
52. See, e.g., Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Davis, 638 F. Supp. 862
(N.D. II1. 1986).
53. 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 312. The fact pattern in Flood is illustrative of the problems that have arisen when two
states concurrently exercise jurisdiction over a child custody matter. By the time the plaintiff filed her
complaint in the federal district court, the courts of both New Jersey and North Dakota had asserted
jurisdiction over the custody determination, each had awarded custody to the parent living within its
borders, and each had refused to enforce the custody decree of the other. Id. at 306.
55. Id. at 312. The Flood court found that the PKPA created a right to have only one state at a time
exercise jurisdiction over a custody matter. Id. at 313.
846
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legislative history, the court determined that although no express private
right of action was created, Congress did not intend to preclude the lower
federal courts from adjudicating PKPA claims. 56 The Flood court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would render the PKPA "virtually nugatory." 57 The
court noted that although Supreme Court review of a final state decision
involving a PKPA claim would be available, this review could not enforce
compliance. The Flood court further found that the Supreme Court simply
does not have the resources to deal with the dozens of interstate child
custody disputes that arise each year. 58
The threshold question in Flood was the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court found that federal question jurisdiction over the
complaint existed because the federal claim was not wholly insubstantial
and frivolous. 59 It reasoned that the PKPA created a statutory right to have
only one state at a time determine custody of a child. Therefore, an
allegation that two courts have issued conflicting custody determinations
was sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction.60
The Flood court did not directly address the federal common law bar to
jurisdiction created by the domestic relations exception 61 because it found
that the domestic relations exception applies only to diversity actions. 62
Nevertheless, the court did consider the concerns underlying the domestic
relations exception in deciding whether abstention 63 was appropriate. The
Flood court found that when two states have concurrently exercised juris-
diction over a child custody matter, a district court only needs to inquire
into preliminary, jurisdictional facts when deciding which court violated
the PKPA. 64 Thus, the court concluded, there is no need for the court to
inquire into the underlying custody dispute.65
Several courts have adopted the Third Circuit's reasoning. 66 Both the
Fourth 67 and Fifth68 Circuits agreed with the Flood court in finding that the
56. Id. at 310-12.
57. Id. at312.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 312 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)).
60. Id. at 313.
61. See supra note 14 for a discussion of the domestic relations exception.
62. Flood, 727 F.2d at 307.
63. Abstention is a federal court doctrine under which federal courts decline to exercise or
postpone the exercise of their jurisdiction in extraordinary or narrowly defined circumstances. See
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
64. Flood, 727 F.2d at 310.
65. Id.
66. The Third Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Flood in DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d
Cir. 1984).
67. Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473 (4th Cir. 1987); Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986).
68. Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Martinez v. Reed, 623 F. Supp. 1050
(E.D. La. 1985), aff'd mem., 783 R2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1986).
847
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PKPA created a private right of action in federal court. A number of district
courts also have followed Flood, some without discussing at all whether a
private right of action was created. 69
2. Cases Finding No Relief Available in Federal Court
In Thompson v. Thompson,70 the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Flood
court that the PKPA conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the federal
courts over conflicting state custody disputes. 71 Nevertheless, the
Thompson court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 72 The court found that Congress did not intend to
create a private right of action when it enacted the PKPA. 73
After exhaustively examining the legislative history of the PKPA, the
Thompson court rejected the Flood court's interpretation of that history. 74
The Thompson court found that the problem identified by Congress had not
been the lack of a private right of action, but rather the absence of uniform,
national standards governing state court assertion of jurisdiction over
custody matters. 75 The court noted that Congress also had considered and
rejected proposals creating a private right of action. 76 The Thompson court
concluded that because the PKPA was modeled after the full faith and credit
clause 77 and its general implementing statute (Section 1738),78 Congress
must have intended that the PKPA to be implemented in the same manner as
Section 1738. 79 The court pointed out that neither the full faith and credit
clause nor Section 1738 authorize a private suit in a federal court for the
69. See, e.g., Olmo v. Olmo, 646 F. Supp. 233,236 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (examined legislative history
of Act and found Congress intended limited role for federal courts in PKPA's enforcement); Davis v.
Davis, 638 F. Supp. 862, 864 (N.D. 11. 1986) (federal question jurisdiction exists because interpreta-
tion of PKPA's detailed federal standards is necessary); Wyman v. Lamer, 624 F. Supp. 240, 243-44
(S.D. Ind. 1985) (following Flood without analysis of its own).
70. 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987).
71. The Ninth Circuit invoked the same standard for federal question jurisdiction as that used in
Flood. Because the cause of action alleged was not patently without merit, the court felt constrained to
find jurisdiction. Id. at 1550 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
70-71 (1978)).
72. Id. at 1559.
73. Id. at 1552.
74. Id. at 1559.
75. Id. at 1554.
76. Id. at 1556-58. See also Addendum toJointHearing, supra note 24, at 104 (letter from Patricia
M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General).
77. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
79. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1556 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 946
(1987).
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purpose of requiring a state court to give full faith and credit to the
judgment of another state's court. 80
The Thompson court also rejected the idea that a private right of action
under the PKPA requires federal courts to make an inquiry only into
preliminary, jurisdictional facts. 81 The court used the facts in Thompson as
an example of a case where inquiry into the underlying custody dispute
might be necessary to determine which state court was exercising jurisdic-
tion consistently with the PKPA. 82
In Rogers v. Platt,83 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
essentially agreed with the analysis of the PKPA's legislative history
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Thompson. However, the Rogers court
applied that analysis to the broader issue of federal questionjurisdiction.84
The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 85
The Rogers court held that the PKPA does not confer federal question
jurisdiction over conflicting state custody determinations. 86 It pointed out
that because jurisdiction would arise only after a state had allegedly
committed an error in applying the PKPA, the court was being asked to
imply a quasi-appellate jurisdiction somewhat akin to habeus corpus. 87 The
court was not willing to do so without an express indication of Congres-
sional intent. 88 Indeed, it found that Congress had specifically intended that
the jurisdiction of the federal courts not be expanded. 89 In reaching this
conclusion, the court.relied on the PKPA's legislative history, the words of
the PKPA, and the fact that the PKPA is codified as an addendum to Section
80. See id. at 1555-56 n.15 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 1558.
82. In Thompson, Louisiana had based its exercise of jurisdiction on allegations of mistreatment
and abuse. Since California had exercised jurisdiction first and continued to assert jurisdiction,
Louisiana might have been precluded under the PKPA from exercising jurisdiction even under the
emergency circumstances provision. However, any time the first state exercises jurisdiction on emer-
gency grounds, the federal court would be compelled to decide whether the child had really been
abandoned or mistreated. Id. at 1558-59.
83. 814 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 689.
85. Id. at 685.
86. Id. at 689.
87. Id. at 689-90.
88. Id. at 694-95.
89. The majority opinion in Rogers also expressed the opinion that the holding in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986), converted the Thompson court's finding
that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action into a determination that federal question
jurisdiction did not exist. Rogers, 814 F.2d at 689. Two members of the panel specially concurred in
order to reserve an opinion on the effect of Merrell Dow on federal question jurisdiction. Rogers, 814
F.2d at 696-97 (Edwards, L, concurring). For an analysis of the effect of Merrell Dow on federal
question jurisdiction over a PKPA action, see infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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1738.90 The Rogers court also noted that Congress had considered and
rejected proposals to expand federal court jurisdiction while enacting the
PKPA. 91 The court stated that not only does Section 1738 not create a
federal cause of action, but it also has long been settled that neither the full
faith and credit clause nor Section 1738 confer federal question jurisdic-
tion. 92
The Rogers court also addressed the domestic relations exception. 93 The
court reasoned that the type of custody dispute likely to reach federal court
would require more than an inquiry into preliminary, jurisdictional facts.94
Because that type of inquiry had traditionally been left to state courts, an
interpretation of the PKPA allowing federal court resolution of interstate
child custody disputes would involve federal judges in an area in which they
are virtual neophytes. 95 The Rogers court was not willing to conclude that
Congress had meant to entrust this task to federal courts without an express
indication of intent.96
The Rogers court is not alone in finding the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
persuasive. 97 One district court approved the reasoning in Thompson but
declined to follow it because it was bound by the prior holding of its court of
appeals. 98 Another district court expressly adopted the result in
Thompson.99
3. The Middle Ground: McDougald v. Jenson
In McDougald v. Jenson, 100 the Eleventh Circuit found that the district
court had the power to issue a declaratory judgment determining which of
two conflicting state custody orders complied with the PKPA. 101 Because a
declaratory judgment is only available if there is subject matter jurisdiction
over the complaint, 0 2 the McDougald court closely examined the issue of
90. Rogers, 814 F.2d at 695-96.
91. Id. at 692-94.
92. Id. at 690-91.
93. Id.at 693-94.
94. Id. at 691.
95. Id. at 695.
96. Id. at 694-95.
97. One district court has also agreed with the Rogers court's finding that there is no federal
question jurisdiction over a PKPA action. Crouse v. Creanza, 658 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (W.D. Wis.
1987).
98. Alexander v. Ferguson, 648 F. Supp. 282, 284 (D. Md. 1986).
99. Leyda v. Roach, 650 F. Supp. 951, 952-53 (S.D. Iowa 1987).
100. 786 F.2d 1465 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 207 (1986).
101. Id. at 1468.
102. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
850
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subject matter jurisdiction over a PKPA action. The court relied on the well-
pleaded complaint rule in finding subject matter jurisdiction. 10 3 The
McDougald court stated that a plaintiff must allege that the custody
determination favorable to the plaintiff was made in accordance with the
PKPA's jurisdictional guidelines to be entitled to a judgment in a state
enforcement action. 104 Because the plaintiff is obliged to establish both the
correctness and applicability of a proposition of federal law, federal ques-
tion jurisdiction exists over the complaint. 105
The McDougald court left several questions open. It declined to decide
whether the PKPA created a private right of action in federal court. 106 The
court was not required to do so because the Declaratory Judgment Act'07
makes a declaratory judgment available regardless of whether further relief
can be obtained.' 0 8 The McDougald court further failed to address the
applicability of the domestic relations exception to a PKPA action. 109
II. ANALYSIS
Subject matter jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining relief
in federal court. The federal courts that have considered the availability of a
federal remedy are split on the question of whether the federal courts have
103. The well-pleaded complaint rule narrows the scope of federal question jurisdiction by
requiring that the plaintiff meet a rigid pleading requirement. A federal question must necessarily
appear on the face of the complaint under technical pleading rules in order for federal question
jurisdiction to exist. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the applicability of the well-pleaded complaint
test in recent years. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9-11. For a general discussion of the well-
pleaded complaint rule see 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 3566 (1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE].
104. McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1480. For a declaratory judgment action to satisfy the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the federal question must be one which would have necessarily appeared on the face of a
complaint asking for traditional coercive or injunctive relief. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 16;
Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 672-73. See generally, 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KAmE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2767 (1982). An enforcement action is the traditional coercive action
which underlies an action for a declaratory judgment under the PKPA. McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1479.
105. McDougald, 786 F2d at 1479 (quoting P. BATOR, P. MIs-KIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND Ta FEDERAL SYSTEM 889 (2d ed. 1973), quoted in Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. at 9).
106. Id. at 1479.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
108. "[A]ny court of the United States. . .may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1982). Although the district court had issued an injunction, the Eleventh Circuit did not have to
consider the propriety of this action. The appellant failed to make a timely appeal of the injunction.
McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1474.
109. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the issuance of a declaratory judgment
allows a federal district court to play an appropriately restricted role in a controversy whose merits it is
ill-equipped to handle. McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1481.
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subject matter jurisdiction over a PKPA action. Because federal courts have
failed to adequately analyze this issue,' 10 this Comment systematically
explores the availability of subject matter jurisdiction over a PKPA action.
In addition, this Comment advocates amending the PKPA to provide a
federal court remedy in cases where an actual jurisdictional conflict exists.
To adequately address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over a
PKPA action, several issues must be considered. These issues include the
effect of the domestic relations exception on the availability of a federal
court remedy, whether federal question jurisdiction exists over a PKPA
action, and finally, whether diversity jurisdiction provides an avenue into
federal court in PKPA cases.
A. The Domestic Relations Exception
The domestic relations exception"'I is firmly entrenched in the federal
court system. 112 Federal courts routinely decline to decide cases that would
require them to grant a divorce, determine alimony or support obligations,
or resolve parental conflicts over the custody of their children. 1 3 The
domestic relations exception has been applied to cases based on both
federal question 1 4 and diversity jurisdiction 15 and to declaratory judg-
ment actions. 16
110. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Thompson decision in January 1987. The court
likely will address the issue of federal question jurisdiction over a PKPA action.
111. The federal courts base their refusal to hear domestic relations cases on different grounds.
Some courts hold that they lack jurisdiction over domestic relations cases. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos,
670 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1982) (lacked jurisdiction because primary issue concerned the status of
husband and wife); Gargallo v. Gargallo, 472 F.2d 1219, 1220 (6th Cir. 1973) (no subject matter
jurisdiction over child custody matter); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88 (D. Md. 1977) (federal courts
do not have jurisdiction over domestic relations cases). Others apply an abstention analysis. See, e.g.,
Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1217 (6th Cir. 1981) (district court properly abstained
from exercising jurisdiction over alimony disputes); Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873, 875
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (abstention appropriate where there are an ongoing series of disputes surrounding the
marital relationship). Regardless of the analytic foundation used to justify the exception, the domestic
relations exception may bar adjudication of a PKPA action even if the requirements for federal question
or diversity jurisdiction are met. Thus, discussion of the domestic relations exception logically precedes
further jurisdictional analysis.
112. See Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction: A Re-Evaluation, 24
B.C.L. REv. 661, 661-62 (1983).
113. See Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d
486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978).
114. See, e.g., Firestonev. ClevelandTrust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981); Bergstrom v.
Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517,520(8th Cir. 1980); Hernstadt v. Hemstadt, 373 F.2d 316,318 (2d Cir. 1967).
115. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1982); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir.
1981).
116. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 431 F. Supp. 371, 377 (W.D. La. 1977) (domestic relations exception
did not bar action for declaratory judgment because domestic controversy was peripheral).
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Even assuming a jurisdictional base, the application of the domestic
relations exception to actions brought under the PKPA at best is unpredicta-
ble. Because the domestic relations exception is largely the creation of the
lower federal courts, the exception is "poorly defined and unevenly ap-
plied."117 The less central the domestic dispute is to the resolution of the
controversy, the more likely a federal court will find it appropriate for it to
resolve the matter itself. 118 Contrary to the Rogers court's conclusion, 119
many actions brought to determine which court can properly exercise
jurisdiction under the PKPA require a court to do no more than inquire into
preliminary jurisdictional facts. 120
Some interstate child custody conflicts require a court to consider the
underlying facts of the custody dispute in deciding which court is exercis-
ing jurisdiction consistently with the PKPA. 121 Several sets of circum-
stances might require a court to inquire into the facts of the underlying
custody dispute. In Thompson, the court pointed out that such an inquiry
might be necessary any time one state asserts jurisdiction on emergency
circumstances grounds.122 Another situation might arise if a court deter-
mines that no state satisfies the home state requirement. 123 In order to
determine which state should exercise jurisdiction under the significant
connection provision, 24 a court must inquire into the underlying facts of
the custody dispute.125
The original bases for the domestic relations exception have been widely
criticized by courts126 and commentators.127 Because federal courts do not
117. Atwood, supra note 14, at 573. See also Allen v. Allen, 518 . Supp. 1234, 1236 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (scope of domestic relations exception is a gray area).
118. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F2d 1039,
1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
119. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Meade v. Meade, 812 E2d 1473, 1476-78 (4th Cir. 1987) (question whether
Virginia had retained continuingjurisdiction); McDougald v. Jenson, 786 E2d 1465, 1481-84 (1 th Cir.
1986) (construction of the word residence in PKPA required); Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138,
1141-43 (5th Cir. 1985) (question whether Texas had continuing jurisdiction under Texas law).
121. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 82.
123. 28 U.S.C § 1738A(b)(4) (1982). The next prioritized section of the PKPA requires a court to
determine whether it is in the child's best interests that a state exercise jurisdiction.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (1982).
125. See, e.g., Rogers v. Platt, 814 F2d 683, 691-92 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
126. See, e.g., Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981) (agreeing that exception is
historically inaccurate but following on basis of tradition); Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F Supp. 797
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (criticizing and calling for abandonment of exception).
127. See Atwood, supra note 14; Note, supra note 112. Today, the exception is most often justified
on the grounds that federal judges lack expertise in domestic relations matters and that federal courts do
not have the resources necessary to deal with domestic controversies. See Note, supra note 14, at
1849-51. Courts also justify the exception on the ground that family matters are an area of special state
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uniformly apply the domestic relations exception, it is impossible to predict
with certainty when the exception will bar an otherwise cognizable PKPA
action. In the absence of an express Congressional directive to the contrary,
the domestic relations exception will keep some PKPA cases out of federal
court. Eliminating the domestic relations exception in PKPA cases would
remove this element of unpredictability from the PKPA's application.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Congressional Consideration of Granting Jurisdiction in a
Substantive Act
It is well settled that Congress has wide discretion in granting jurisdic-
tion to the lower federal courts. 128 If Congress had a specific intent on the
question of jurisdiction in enacting a statute, that intent should control the
determination of whether federal question jurisdiction exists in an action
under that statute. 129
In Rogers v. Platt,130 the court relied on several distinct factors in
determining that Congress specifically excluded jurisdiction over PKPA
actions from the federal courts. 13 1 The most persuasive factor was the
nature of the jurisdiction courts have asserted under the PKPA. 132 Congress
specifically rejected proposals to extend federal jurisdiction to allow en-
forcement of custody determinations in federal court. 133 If Congress had
intended to create the unique quasi-appellate jurisdiction found by the
Flood court, it certainly would have expressly indicated that intent. It has
not hesitated to do so with other statutes. 134
The relationship between the PKPA and Section 1738 also supports the
position that Congress specifically intended that the jurisdiction of the
federal courts not be extended. The PKPA is codified as an addendum to
concern. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982); Phillips, Nizer. Benjamin,
Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973).
128. See generally, C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (4th ed. 1983).
129. Rogers v. Rogers, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3244 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
130. 814 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir 1987).
131. See Rogers, 814 F.2d at 695-96.
132. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
133. In testifying about the House version of what later became the PKPA, the bill's sponsor,
Congressman Bennett, stated:
I do not envision this being anything in the [flederal court's handling at all. I envision it being as it
is now, a matter which would be considered by the court which fixed the custody in the first place,
or which might amend it in the second place, and it would not be a [flederal court . ...
Parental Kidnaping: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Congressman Bennett).
134. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
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Section 1738.135 Section 1738 does not confer federal question jurisdiction
on the federal courts. 136 There is no reason to think the rule of jurisdiction
applied to the PKPA should be different. 137
2. Jurisdiction Under the Federal Question Statute
In order for federal question jurisdiction to exist over a complaint, the
action must arise under federal law.138 The courts have had difficulty
defining when a claim arises under federal law for the purposes of the
federal question statute. 139 In 1983, the Supreme Court attempted to
articulate a precise standard to determine the existence of federal question
jurisdiction. The Court held that federal question jurisdiction exists if: One,
federal law creates the cause of action; or if, two, vindication of a right
under state law necessarily turns on some construction of federal law. 40
The Flood, Thompson, and McDougald courts relied on the federal ques-
tion statute in finding that subject matter jurisdiction existed. 141 Under the
standards promulgated by the Supreme Court, however, the existence of
federal question jurisdiction over an action to enforce a custody determina-
tion under the PKPA is unsupportable.
a. Creation of a PrivateRight of Action
The Flood court concluded that the PKPA created a private, federal
cause of action. The Thompson court concluded that the PKPA did not. The
Thompson court was correct for two reasons. First, Congress did not intend
to create a federal remedy. Second, domestic relations matters have tradi-
tionally been relegated to state law.
In deciding whether a particular statute has created a private right of
action to enforce its terms in federal court, the dispositive issue is whether
Congress intended to create a private right of action. 142 Congressional
intent is determined from the language of the statute itself and the statute's
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
136. Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904); Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega
Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151 (SthCir. 1974); see also FEDERAL PRAcrTcE, supra note 103, § 3563, at 50.
137. See Note, Flood v. Braaten: Federal Jurisdiction Under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 117, 126-27 [hereinafter Federal Jurisdiction Under the PKPA].
138. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Even though the language of the federal question statute mirrors that
of the arising under provision of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, it has long been settled that
the statutory grant is narrower than that of the Constitution. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3232 (1986); see also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8.
140. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28.
141. See supra notes 59, 71, 103 and accompanying text.
142. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981).
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legislative history.143 The Supreme Court has articulated four factors to
consider in evaluating Congressional intent. These factors are: One,
whether the plaintiff is one of the particular class for whose benefit the
statute was enacted; two, whether Congress explicitly or implicitly indi-
cated an intent to create or deny such an action; three, whether such an
action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme;
and four, whether the action is one that has traditionally been relegated to
state law. 144 These factors are merely guides for the courts to follow in
determining legislative intent. As the Thompson court indicated, the intent
of Congress is the determinative factor. 145
Courts finding a remedy under the PKPA available in federal court have
implied a very narrow cause of action. 146 These courts relied heavily on the
first and third factors in finding that plaintiffs can maintain a suit in federal
court if an interstate custody dispute exists. 147 They have found that parents
are part of a class the Act was designed to benefit and that a federal cause of
action is necessary to effectuate the underlying purposes of the PKPA. 148
Nevertheless, other factors suggest that Congress did not intend to create
even this narrow private right of action.
No private right of action can be found in the PKPA's language or
legislative history. The Act directs the appropriate authorities of every state
to comply with its terms. 149 The Congressional findings and declaration of
purpose for the PKPA are also aimed at state courts. 150 Congress consid-
ered and rejected proposals to provide access to the federal courts under the
PKPA. 151
143. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-71 (1979).
144. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
145. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross,
442 U.S. at 575-76.
146. See Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 1143 (1985) (no right to relief until an impasse has
actually been reached). Even the Flood court concluded that Congress had rejected the creation of a
federal cause of action to initially enforce a custody determination. Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 310
(3d Cir. 1984).
147. Flood did not explicitly discuss the Cort factors. However, the Flood court essentially relied
on the first and third factors in finding a cause of action. See Flood, 727 F.2d at 310-13.
148. See, e.g., Flood 727 F.2d at 312.
149. "The appropriate authorities of every [s]tate shall. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982).
150. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3566,
3568-69 (1980).
151. Among these was a proposal by Congressman Fish to amend the diversity jurisdiction statute
to allow a parent to bring an action in federal court to enforce a child custody order against a parent who
had removed the child to another jurisdiction in contravention of that order. Congressman Conyers
while questioning Congressman Fish about his proposal expressed the view that it would be preferable
to impose the duty for enforcement on the state courts. House Hearing, supra note 133, at 14 (testimony
of Congressman Hamilton Fish).
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A recurring theme in the hearings before both the Senate and the House
was a desire to hold federal interference in an area that had traditionally
been reserved to the states to a minimum. 152 Congress was concerned about
overburdening the federal courts. 153 In addition, it expressed concern that
allowing federal courts to enforce custody determinations would merely
increase the total amount of litigation in custody disputes.154
A second factor also indicates that the PKPA did not create a federal
cause of action. In the absence of an explicit indication of Congressional
intent to the contrary, the courts rely on the fact that a cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law.155 Domestic relations matters have
traditionally been a subject for state rather than federal law. 156 Therefore,
this factor weighs against finding that Congress intended to create a federal
cause of action.
The Flood court's finding that Congress created a private right of action
is in direct contrast to Congressional intent and the traditional reservation
of domestic relations jurisdiction to the states. Although parents are part of
the class to be benefited by the statute and the absence of such an action
may frustrate Congress's purpose in enacting the PKPA, the Thompson
court was correct in determining that these factors are not enough to
overcome those militating against a finding that Congress intended to
create a private right of action. The ultimate issue is whether Congress
intended to create a cause of action. 157 The legislative history and language
of the PKPA indicate that Congress intended that no federal cause of action
be created.
Enforcement actions have existed for many years under state law. 158 The
PKPA simply created a rule of decision to be applied by state courts in
deciding whether the custody determination of another state is entitled to
enforcement. If properly applied, the right to enforce a child custody
determination across state lines is a valuable one, but the PKPA does not
create a cause of action to enforce a determination in federal court.
152. For instance, Congressman Duncan expressed the view that, "[b]y reserving the [f]ederal role
to the creation of a Federal Parental Locator Service and FBI investigation after a sufficient lapse of
time, we hold [flederal interference to the minimum." JointHearing, supra note 2, at 20 (testimony of
Congressman Duncan).
153. See House Hearing, supra note 133, at 14 (statement of Congressman Conyers).
154. Id.
155. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
156. See Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1984); Note, Application of the Federal
Abstention Doctrine to the Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 1983 DuKE
L.J. 1095, 1096-1100 (1983).
157. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
158. See Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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b. Vindication of a Right Under State Law
The second category of actions that fit under the federal question statute
are those where vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on
some construction of federal law. 159 In order for jurisdiction to be present
under this category, a substantial question of federal law must be in
dispute. 160 It is not sufficient that federal law is an element of the contro-
versy. 161 In addition, the plaintiff must meet the test of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 162
A 1986 Supreme Court decision further emphasized the narrowness of
this category of actions arising under federal law. 163 A narrow majority of
the Court held in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson164 that
when Congress determines that there will be no private, federal cause of
action for the violation of a federal statute, a complaint alleging a violation
of that statute as an ingredient of a state cause of action does not confer
federal question jurisdiction over the complaint. 165
Because Congress did not create a federal cause of action in enacting the
PKPA, 166 Merrell Dow seems to preclude finding jurisdiction under the
second prong of the Supreme Court's test. 167 Regardless of the effect of
Merrell Dow, jurisdiction under this prong would only arise pursuant to a
substantial question of the construction or validity of the PKPA. 168 Relief
from an incorrect state court interpretation of the PKPA must come from
the appellate process. 169
159. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983). For
examples of cases where federal question jurisdiction has been found under this prong see Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 198 (1921) (jurisdiction exists over shareholder suit to
enjoin investment where only disputed question is validity of acts of Congress creating national banks);
Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917) (jurisdiction over action to remove cloud from title to land
where controversy concerns the construction and effect of federal mining laws).
160. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13.
161. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936).
162. The well-pleaded complaint rule requires that in order for federal question jurisdiction to exist
over a claim under the second prong of the test the federal question must necessarily appear on the face
of the complaint. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. As the Court stated in Franchise Tax
Bd., "The rule . . . may produce awkward results . . . . Nevertheless, it has been correctly
understood to apply in such situations." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12.
163. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 3237.
166. See supra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
167. Merrell Dow may be distinguishable from an action brought under the PKPA. Not only would
a plaintiff have to allege a violation of the PKPA to be entitled to relief but the plaintiff would also have
to show that a custody determination favorable to the plaintiff was issued in accordance with the PKPA.
Whether this makes a difference is uncertain at this time. See Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 696-97
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring).
168. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
169. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
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The McDougald court is the only court to rely on this prong in finding
federal question jurisdiction over a PKPA action. 170 The McDougald court
applied the well-pleaded complaint rule in determining that an action for a
declaratory judgment under the PKPA could be maintained in federal
court. 171 The Eleventh Circuit was correct in stating that a plaintiff neces-
sarily must allege in a state enforcement action that the plaintiff's custody
determination was made consistently with the PKPA's jurisdictional guide-
lines to be entitled to enforcement as a matter of right.1 72 Nonetheless, the
McDougald court's conclusion that there is federal question jurisdiction
under the second prong of the Supreme Court's test is incorrect.
There are several reasons why the McDougald court's reasoning is
unpersuasive. First, while the PKPA forms an element of the state enforce-
ment action, 1 73 no disputed question of federal law necessarily appears on
the face of the complaint.' 74 Second, no federal court has found that the
PKPA confers original jurisdiction to enforce custody determinations in
federal court. 175 If the federal courts were to follow the McDougald court's
reasoning, plaintiffs would be able to circumvent Congressional intent by
bringing an action for a declaratory judgment176 under the second prong of
the federal question test. Merrell Dow specifically disapproves exercising
jurisdiction in contravention of Congressional intent. 177 Finally, an action
alleging that ajudgment is entitled to enforcement under Section 1738 does
not fit under the federal question statute's grant of jurisdiction. 78 There-
fore, federal question jurisdiction over a PKPA action does not exist simply
170. McDougald does not discuss MerrellDow's effect on the second prong ofjurisdiction because
MerrellDow was not decided at the time of the McDougald decision. McDougald was decided on April
21, 1986. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1465 (Ilth Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 207 (1986).
Merrell Dow was decided July 7, 1986. Merrell Dow, 106 S. Ct. at3229.
171. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
173. "Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of
the suit." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115 (1936).
174. The dispute would only arise if the defendant in the enforcement action raised as a defense the
existence of a custody determination in the defendant's favor or that the plaintiff's custody determina-
tion was not entitled to enforcement. The plaintiff is not entitled to anticipate a defense under the well-
pleaded complaint rule. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10
(1983); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
175. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
176. Any action for injunctive relief would probably be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. See McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1480 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 207 (1986).
177. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3236 (1986).
178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. McDougald tried to distinguish the PKPA from
Section 1738 because the PKPA sets up detailed standards a custody determination must meet in order to
be entitled to enforcement. McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1479-80. These standards are designed, however,
to avoid multiple custody determinations not to set up federal question jurisdiction. See Rogers v. Platt,
814 F.2d 683, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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because vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on the
PKPA's construction.
The PKPA does not create federal question jurisdiction to settle interstate
child custody disputes in its current form. Congress did not intend to allow
parents to seek relief in federal court when a state court allegedly has
misinterpreted the PKPA and asserted jurisdiction inconsistently with the
Act. Whether this intent was directed to the ultimate question of jurisdic-
tion or to the creation of a cause of action, its effect is to foreclose federal
question jurisdiction over a PKPA action.
3. Diversity Jurisdiction
Several commentators have suggested that diversity jurisdiction should
provide an avenue into federal court in interstate custody disputes in the
absence of federal question jurisdiction. 179 The diversity of citizenship
requirement 80 often will be met when two states concurrently exercise
jurisdiction. 181 The amount in controversy requirement, 182 however, is a
real obstacle to diversity jurisdiction. 183
An action for enforcement of a custody determination usually does not
involve a claim for money damages. In some cases, a plaintiff may be able
to meet the amount in controversy requirement by combining an enforce-
ment action with another claim. A tort action for intentional interference
with custodial rights commonly is suggested as a way to reach the $10,000
requirement. 184
Diversity jurisdiction is not the answer to interstate custody disputes. It
is not always possible to combine a tort action with a claim for enforcement
of a custody determination. 185 Some jurisdictions do not recognize inten-
tional interference with custodial rights as a tort. 186 Also, a parent will not
always have a claim for intentional interference even in jurisdictions that do
179. See Krauskopf, supra note 8, at 441-42; Federal Jurisdiction Under the PKPA, supra note
137, at 132-33.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982).
181. This will not always be true because in some instances a contestant may still be considered a
domiciliary of the same state as the other contestant regardless of where each resides.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
183. Cf. New York ex rel. Larson v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 464 F. Supp. 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
184. See, e.g., Federal Jurisdiction Under the PKPA, supra note 137, at 132-33.
185. For a general discussion of child snatching tort suits see P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A VOLENIK &
J. O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND
LAW, 14-1 to 14-17 (1982).
186. For instance, the plaintiff in McDougald had combined a tort suit with his PKPA action but
was not able to recover because the court found that Florida does not recognize a tort for intentional
interference with custodial rights. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1489-90 (1lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 246 (1986).
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allow recovery. 187 Finally, the domestic relations exception may bar resolu-
tion of the custody dispute if an inquiry into the underlying facts of the
custody dispute would be necessary. 188
C. The PKPA Should Be Amended To Include a Federal Court Remedy
The current PKPA does not contemplate a federal court remedy. 189 In the
face of continuing problems arising under the PKPA, the arguments for
leaving custody determinations completely to the states are unpersuasive.
The states have shown that they are not capable of solving the problem of
interstate child custody disputes on their own. 190 The most effective way to
end interstate child custody disputes is a Congressional amendment that
creates a federal cause of action.
The PKPA should be amended to include a private right of action for
enforcement of a custody determination made consistently with its provi-
sions in federal court. 191 This action should accrue whenever a second state
improperly agrees to modify a custody determination or issues a conflicting
custody determination. Restricting the action to cases where an actual
interstate conflict arises would keep the federal courts from being overbur-
dened. 192
The enforcement action should be explicitly exempted from the domestic
relations exception in order to make it clear that a federal court should make
whatever determination is necessary to settle an interstate child custody
dispute. Although federal judges lack experience in applying child custody
law, these same judges competently apply complex state and federal law
routinely. There is no reason to believe they could not do so with custody
law. The federal courts would not award custody themselves. They simply
187. For example, the other parent may have removed the child from the jurisdiction before any
custody determination has been reached. Also, each parent may have a good faith belief that they have a
valid determination in their favor.
188. See supra notes 111-27 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text. The PKPA could be amended to prohibit all
concurrent exercises ofjurisdiction by the states. This would not be a satisfactory solution. It is possible
to imagine states disagreeing over when jurisdiction has commenced. Also, the nature of the interests
involved require some flexibility in the statute. For instance, in a true emergency, a state should be able
to temporarily assert jurisdiction over a custody matter despite a concurrent proceeding in another state.
191. Congress should include an attorney's fees and expenses provision similar to the one the
PKPA presently encourages state courts to apply. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(c), 94 Stat. 3566,
3571 (1980).
192. There are no statistics on the actual number of interstate child custody conflicts that occur
each year. Whether it is the scores asserted by the Flood court, Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303,312 (3d
Cir. 1984), or the smaller number asserted by the Thompson court, Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d
1547, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987), restricting the federal cause of action to
these situations should keep the federal courts from being overburdened.
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would decide which state properly asserted jurisdiction under the PKPA.
While the federal courts would sometimes be required to decide issues of
substantive custody law, the federal courts would not actually make
custody determinations themselves.
Congress' other major concerns in enacting the PKPA were tradition and
federalism. 193 These are important considerations. Nevertheless, these
considerations should not be overriding when compared with a problem
that the states have not been able to solve on their own and with the resulting
instability in families. Restricting the federal cause of action to cases where
an actual conflict arises will keep federal interference to a minimum.
III. CONCLUSION
The availability of a federal remedy in interstate child custody disputes
has been a controversial issue since the PKPA was enacted. The legislative
history of the PKPA indicates that Congress did not intend enforcement of
the PKPA in federal courts. The federal courts currently have subject matter
jurisdiction over a PKPA action in very limited circumstances. Unfor-
tunately, the result reached in Rogers and Thompson, while correct, leaves
the problem of interstate child custody disputes unsolved.
A reevaluation of the role federal courts should play in resolving
interstate child custody disputes is necessary. Despite Congress' desire to
keep federal involvement in custody disputes to a minimum, a larger
federal role is necessary to effectively deal with interstate custody disputes.
A party with a valid custody determination should be allowed to bring
an action to enforce it against a party seeking to relitigate the issue in
another forum. The PKPA should be amended to provide for the enforce-
ment of custody determinations made consistently with its provisions in
federal court.
Ann T. Wilson
193. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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